**** BEGIN LOGGING AT Wed Aug 10 02:59:56 2022 Aug 10 20:19:17 promoted comment (without 12ft cleaner): >> While this article focuses on UEFI, similar attacks are probably feasible against Uboot (many ARM platforms) and iBoot (IOS & M1/M2). They'd be different in detail, but not in concept. We may need to go back in time to putting the lowest-level firmware in ROM to provide a root of trust that can't be compromised after manufacture. The ROM would then boot a signed UEFI to initialize the hardware and OS. << Aug 10 20:19:27 https://12ft.io/proxy?q=https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2022/07/researchers-unpack-unkillable-uefi-rootkit-that-survives-os-reinstalls Aug 10 20:20:18 well, at least OMAP has ROMBL that for all I know can't get compromised Aug 10 20:21:39 so coldflashing a pristine NOLO would fix that exploit for N900 Aug 11 02:12:38 but ROMBL doesn't have a trusted public key that it uses for validating flashed images, does it? The point is that to prevent the attack, you need to prevent flashing of unauthentic UEFI images. Aug 11 02:14:47 I suspect most UEFI systems can be "fixed" in the same way as NOLO can, by having a flasher in ROM that can reliably be invoked, but the goal should be to prevent it needing to be fixed. Aug 11 02:19:45 or rather, prevent flashing of unauthentig images, or verify the image on boot. boot verification is probably simpler, since if you go the flash prevention way, you'll probably have to make it so flashing becomes impossible by the time UEFI boots. Aug 11 02:35:25 tbh though, I was under the impression that iPhones already did something like that, where they have a public key burnt into ROM. Aug 11 02:36:40 I'm also fairly sure my Android phone does it (OnePlus Nord N10), and other newer Android phones. Aug 11 02:38:50 I've rooted my Android phone, and I've relocked the bootloader with my own key, so when booting, the firmware will tell me that it's using a custom key, and it shows a fingerprint of my key. Aug 11 02:42:13 I can try to overwrite that firmware, since it exists as a partition that's writable from the OS, but I'm fairly sure it will refuse to boot at that point, and I would have to use the "firehose" mechanism to reflash the phone, which presumably destroys user data before loading the firmvare again. Aug 11 02:43:58 similarly, when the bootloader is unlocked, it will also show a message indicating that the boot sequence has been tampered with. Aug 11 02:59:23 personally I think it would be better to have all storage be removable, except the bootrom which isn't modifiable. then you just put the software you want in the storage device you want and boot it **** ENDING LOGGING AT Thu Aug 11 02:59:56 2022